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“TO ASSEMBLE TOGETHER FOR THEIR 
COMMON GOOD”:  HISTORY, ETHNOGRAPHY, 
AND THE ORIGINAL MEANINGS 
OF THE RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY AND SPEECH 
Saul Cornell* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Whiskey Rebellion is not generally a major focus in constitutional 
histories or casebooks.  Given this fact, it is hardly surprising that the 1795 
case Respublica v. Montgomery1 seldom figures as more than a minor 
footnote in scholarly writing about early American constitutional 
development, if it receives any attention at all.2  The case has little 
precedential value for modern First Amendment doctrine and only 
obliquely implicates larger jurisprudential questions about the rights of 
assembly and freedom of expression.3  In strictly doctrinal terms, 
Montgomery is primarily about the obligation of a justice of the peace to put 
down a riot, not an extended judicial disquisition on the meaning of early 
American freedom of association or expression.4  Montgomery was one of 
several cases that resulted from popular protest during the Whiskey 
 
*  Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History, Fordham University.  I would like to 
thank Alfred Brophy, Martin Flaherty, Jonathan Gienapp, and Jud Campbell for helpful 
suggestions. 
 
 1. 1 Yeates 419 (Pa. 1795).  The legal and constitutional history of the Whiskey 
Rebellion remains largely unwritten.  The most important legal study of the Whiskey 
Rebellion is Wythe Holt, The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794:  A Democratic Working-Class 
Insurrection (Jan. 23, 2004) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). 
 2. The standard narrative history does not discuss the case and devotes brief coverage 
to the Whiskey Rebellion. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF 
LIBERTY:  A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 135–36 (2d ed. 2002).  Nor 
does the case figure in the standard casebooks by leading scholars. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. 
STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT (3d ed. 2008); EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES:  PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS (3d ed. 
2008). 
 3. See infra Part III. Contra Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original 
Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1071–75 (2009) (approaching 
Montgomery anachronistically and conflating the radically different visions of law at work in 
the case). 
 4. See Montgomery, 1 Yeates at 422.  The modern scholarly literature on the right of 
assembly is relatively small when compared to the considerable literature on other aspects of 
core First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of 
Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543 (2009); John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of 
Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565 (2010); Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. 
L. REV. 639 (2002). 
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Rebellion, specifically the raising of liberty poles in sympathy with Western 
opponents of the unpopular tax.5  Yet, from the perspective of a new 
constitutional historicism, an approach to the constitutional past that unites 
elements of a traditional top-down, court-centered narrative and the bottom-
up perspective inspired by social history and cultural history, Montgomery 
is precisely the type of case that can be most illuminating.6  Indeed 
Montgomery provides a perfect occasion to engage in a form of historically 
grounded “constitutional ethnography.”7 
The purpose of such an inquiry is to explore how contests over legal 
meaning in the American past shaped the emergence of modern law.  
Ethnographic inquiry is holistic in nature.8  Clifford Geertz notes that such 
a method invariably requires “[h]opping back and forth between the whole 
conceived through the parts that actualize it and the parts conceived through 
the whole that motivates them.”9  The consequences of such a holistic 
approach to intellectual history have been elaborated by historian and 
political theorist Mark Bevir, who argues that meanings derive from the 
networks of belief on which they are built.10 
 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. For a good sampling of recent work in the new constitutional historicism, see the 
essays in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA (Michael Grossberg & Christopher 
Tomlins eds., 2008). 
 7. In her explication of the goals of constitutional ethnography, Kim Lane Scheppele 
captures the essence of such inquiries: 
[C]onstitutional ethnography does not ask about the big correlations between the 
specifics of constitutional design and the effectiveness of specific institutions but 
instead looks to the logics of particular contexts as a way of illuminating complex 
interrelationships among political, legal, historical, social, economic, and cultural 
elements.  The goal of constitutional ethnography is to better understand how 
constitutional systems operate by identifying the mechanisms through which 
governance is accomplished and the strategies through which governance is 
attempted, experienced, resisted and revised, taken in historical depth and cultural 
context. 
Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Ethnography:  An Introduction, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
389, 390–91 (2004). 
 8. VINCENT DESCOMBES, THE INSTITUTIONS OF MEANING:  A DEFENSE OF 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL HOLISM (Stephen Adam Schwartz trans., 2014); Anthropological 
Holism, BLACKWELL REFERENCE ONLINE, http://www.blackwellreference.com/subscriber/ 
tocnode.html?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g97814051067952_ss1-152 (last visited Nov. 27, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/HV29-FALP]. 
 9. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:  FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE 
ANTHROPOLOGY 69 (1983); see also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 
9–10, 412–53 (1973) [hereinafter GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES]. 
 10. See generally MARK BEVIR, THE LOGIC OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1999) 
(synthesizing elements of weak intentionalism, meaning holism, and anti-foundationalist 
historicism into a coherent theoretical foundation for historical inquiry).  For a more recent 
and concise statement of his method, see Mark Bevir, Contextualism:  From Modernist 
Method to Post-Analytic Historicism, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 211 (2009).  For a sympathetic 
comment on Bevir’s method that recasts his approach in terms of Grice’s intention-based 
semantics and pragmatics and expressly rejects strong holism in favor of moderate holism, 
see A. P. Martinich, A Moderate Logic of the History of Ideas, 73 J. HIST. IDEAS 609 (2012).  
Although American historians have not engaged with Bevir’s important work in a systematic 
fashion, most intellectual and cultural historians would likely find Martinich’s amended 
version of Bevir’s model congenial.  One important exception to the general lack of attention 
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To understand the meaning of post-Revolutionary era constitutional 
thought and culture, including the rights of assembly and speech, one must 
locate these two concepts in the wider webs of legal and constitutional 
belief in place during the Founding era; this process requires a form of thick 
contextualism.  One must move beyond matters of mere linguistic usage, 
speculations about ideal readers, and the thin notions of context associated 
with originalist inquiry.11  Instead, one must engage in an archeological 
project to uncover the discursive foundations for Founding-era legal and 
political ideologies.12  Finally, building on post-Geertzian ethnography and 
sociolinguistics, it is essential to start with the fact that post-Revolutionary 
era America was not a single homogenous speech community, particularly 
when it came to legal and political speech.13  Although English-speaking 
Americans may have been part of a single linguistic community, such 
commonalities did not obliterate the presence of distinctive political and 
legal speech communities shaped by categories such as race, class, gender, 
region, ethnicity, religion, and ideology.14  Thus, as Montgomery makes 
clear, the views of elite Federalists and Republicans in Pennsylvania were 
different in many key areas.  Complicating matters further is the issue of 
popular constitutionalism.  A distinctive plebeian form of popular 
 
to holism is Jonathan Gienapp’s important Essay in this forum, Historicism and Holism:  
Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 (2015). 
 11. See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
65, 66 (2011). See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods 
Originalism:  A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 751 (2009); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How 
Not to), 115 YALE L.J. 2037 (2006); Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive 
Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539 (2005); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis:  The 
Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).  
For a sample of some of the emerging critiques of originalism’s theoretical flaws, see 
Gregory Bassham & Ian Oakley, New Textualism:  The Potholes Ahead, 28 RATIO JURIS 127 
(2015); Saul Cornell, Originalism As Thin Description:  An Interdisciplinary Critique, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 1 (2015), http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/res-gestae/ 
volume/84/Cornell.pdf [http://perma.cc/4E5Z-PTSN]; Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional 
Interpretation and History:  New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 283, 304 
(2014). 
 12. The notion of archeology here draws on Foucault and his analysis of the relationship 
between power and discourse. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF 
KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1972) (1969).  The secondary 
literature on Foucault is enormous; good starting points are Gary Gutting, Michel Foucault, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. ARCHIVE (May 22, 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/win2014/entries/foucault/ [http://perma.cc/N4JB-TPLL] and THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO MICHEL FOUCAULT (Gary Gutting ed., 2d ed. 2005). 
 13. For an overview of this literature and its relevance to constitutional history, see 
generally Cornell, supra note 11.  For a useful introduction to this literature, see Alessandro 
Duranti, Ethnography of Speaking:  Toward a Linguistics of the Praxis, in 4 LINGUISTICS:  
THE CAMBRIDGE SURVEY 210, 217 (Frederick J. Newmeyer ed., 1988); Elizabeth Keating, 
The Ethnography of Communication, in HANDBOOK OF ETHNOGRAPHY 285, 290–92 (Paul 
Atkinson et al. eds., 2007); John J. Gumperz & Jenny Cook-Gumperz, Studying Language, 
Culture, and Society:  Sociolinguistics or Linguistic Anthropology?, 12 J. SOCIOLINGUISTICS 
532 (2008). 
 14. See Cornell, supra note 11, at 7. 
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constitutionalism represented a third constitutional culture and discourse in 
play during the Whiskey Rebellion.15 
The potential for such a new constitutional historicism to illuminate 
Founding-era patterns of thought and belief, including legal ideas, is 
enormous.  The work of an earlier generation of cultural historians armed 
with similar methodological tools radically transformed conventional 
intellectual history.  Historians such as Rhys Isaac and Robert Darnton 
analyzed events at the margin of traditional historical narratives and 
transformed them into rich texts for unraveling the cultural history of 
Revolutionary-era America and eighteenth-century France.16  The goal of a 
new constitutional historicism is analogous:  to approach familiar and 
unfamiliar legal texts with an appreciation for the complexity and 
contingency that defined post-Revolutionary American constitutional 
development.17 
Montgomery not only demonstrates the contested nature of early 
American constitutionalism, it also serves as a reminder that Founding-era 
ideas about law, liberty, rights, and even language itself were radically 
different than their modern counterparts.  This insight has become all the 
more valuable given the revival of interest in originalism.18  Rather than 
recognize the diversity of Founding-era constitutionalism, most originalist 
scholarship approaches the Founding era with a model of consensus history 
that was discredited more than a generation ago.19  Originalists have 
ignored the diversity and contestation that marked this period and instead 
have sought out a fixed original meaning for various provisions of the 
Constitution.20  Flux, not fixation, was the defining feature of post-
 
 15. See generally Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates:  Popular 
Constitutionalism and the Whiskey Rebellion, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883 (2006). 
 16. See generally ROBERT DARNTON, THE GREAT CAT MASSACRE AND OTHER EPISODES 
IN FRENCH CULTURAL HISTORY (1984); RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA 
1740–1790 (1982).  On the impact of Geertz on cultural history, see William H. Sewell, Jr., 
Geertz, Cultural Systems, and History:  From Synchrony to Transformation, 59 
REPRESENTATIONS 35 (1997). 
 17. Saul Cornell, Conflict, Consensus & Constitutional Meaning:  The Enduring Legacy 
of Charles Beard, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 385 (2014).  As Jack Rakove’s important 
contribution to this forum makes clear, one need not embrace any of Beard’s materialistic 
assumptions to recognize the revolutionary ferment in the period between the American 
Revolution and the framing of the Constitution. See Jack Rakove, Tone Deaf to the Past:  
More Qualms About Public Meaning Originalism, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 969 (2015).  
Moreover, Rakove wisely notes that constitutional communication in a revolutionary age 
shares very few features with ordinary conversation, a fact which makes the turn to ordinary 
language philosophy models by some originalists all the more puzzling and problematic. See 
Solum, supra note 11. 
 18. For an overview of recent debates over originalist methodology, see generally Keith 
E. Whittington, Originalism:  A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013). 
 19. See generally Cornell, supra note 11.  On consensus history, see John Higham, 
Changing Paradigms:  The Collapse of Consensus History, 76 J. AM. HIST. 460 (1989) and 
Michael Kammen, The Problem of American Exceptionalism:  A Reconsideration, 45 AM. Q. 
1 (1993). 
 20. Virtually all forms of the so-called new originalism begin with an unexamined set of 
assumptions about language, history, and meaning that rest on a vision of consensus history 
that is untenable. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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Revolutionary era legal and political discourse.  To the degree that ideas 
were fixed, this process was remarkably short-lived and dependent on 
political and ideological forces.  As political times changed and new 
theoretical insights emerged, alternative readings of the Constitution 
proliferated with them.21 
One key aspect of the new constitutional historicism is its emphasis on 
exploring popular constitutionalism as a vital force in the early Republic.22  
Restoring a voice to individuals and groups that have been drowned out or 
silenced in standard accounts serves several purposes.23  The most obvious 
advantage of including such voices is that it serves as a reminder that early 
American constitutionalism was a contentious and sometimes raucous 
debate.24  The new constitutionalism does not seek to substitute a new 
heroic counternarrative in place of traditional accounts.25  The point of 
recovering neglected voices is not to substitute their vision of law for the 
more familiar ones of James Madison or John Marshall, but rather to show 
how early American constitutional development was contested and 
contingent from the beginning and did not unfold in an inexorable 
manner.26  Although the focus on a minor case may seem odd, it is 
important to recall that discussions of Balinese cockfights27 and tales about 
angry apprentices massacring cats in eighteenth-century France28 did not 
seem all that important in the grand scheme of things prior to the work of 
ethnographically oriented scholars.29  Applying this approach to seemingly 
minor texts has helped historians unearth the underlying structures of power 
that have shaped culture and politics.30  An understanding of these forgotten 
 
 21. Madison’s evolving constitutional thought provides the most obvious example of 
how changed circumstances and new theoretical insights transform constitutional meaning 
over time.  On Madison’s evolving thought, see generally DREW R. MCCOY, THE LAST OF 
THE FATHERS:  JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY (1989). 
 22. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004). 
 23. See generally Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of 
Constitutional Ideas:  The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 721 (2013) (analyzing the flaws in originalist approaches to the past and suggesting the 
promise of intellectual history as a method for discovering the meanings of historical legal 
texts); Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Language:  Pragmatics, Poetics, and Social Power, 23 ANN. 
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 435 (1994) (exploring the potential of the methods of linguistic 
anthropology and the ethnography of speaking to illuminate the connections among law, 
discourse, and power); Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the 
Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575 (2011) (discussing the 
need to recover the Founding era’s very different views about language in general and 
constitutional communication in particular). 
 24. See generally Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution Vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution:  
Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 295 (2011). 
 25. See generally Cornell, supra note 17. 
 26. See generally id. 
 27. See GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, supra note 9, at 412–53. 
 28. See DARNTON, supra note 16. 
 29. On the contribution of these scholars and others influenced by Geertz, see generally 
Sewell, Jr., supra note 16. 
 30. For two critiques of Darnton’s method that underscore the centrality of his approach 
to recent cultural history, see generally Dominick LaCapra, Chartier, Darnton, and the 
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pasts is a necessary first step toward making sense of the present and 
charting a course for the future. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL DRAMAS OUT OF DOORS 
Federalist policies in the years after ratification were shaped by 
Alexander Hamilton’s bold economic agenda.31  The ambitious Secretary of 
the Treasury believed that America’s future depended on creating a 
powerful military and fiscal state based on the British model.32  To 
accomplish this goal, America needed sources of revenue, which meant 
imposing new taxes.33  In 1791, the Federalist-dominated Congress adopted 
a tax on distilled grain (“the whiskey tax”), triggering protests across a 
broad swath of the backcountry running from Pennsylvania through 
Virginia to Kentucky.34  The whiskey tax fell hardest on the farmers in 
these regions who distilled their grains into hard spirits, which not only 
fetched a higher price at market, but also were far cheaper to transport to 
eastern consumers.35  In Kentucky, opposition to the tax was so pervasive it 
was virtually impossible to collect any revenue or prosecute tax 
resistance.36  Opposition to the excise in western Pennsylvania was also 
intense, but resistance in this region did not achieve the same level of 
cohesion as it did in Kentucky.37  One important difference between the two 
regions was the role played by local elites.  In Kentucky, opposition to the 
tax enjoyed considerable support from the local elites.38  The middling 
yeoman elite who dominated politics in western Pennsylvania opposed 
Federalist policy, but their sympathy with the grievances of the protestors 
stopped short of support for extralegal action or armed resistance.39 
Protest in western Pennsylvania had begun peacefully, but hardly 
deferentially.  Opposition to the excise drew on a rich tradition of plebeian 
 
Great Symbol Massacre, 60 J. MOD. HIST. 95 (1988) and Harold Mah, Suppressing the Text:  
The Metaphysics of Ethnographic History in Darnton’s Great Cat Massacre, 31 HIST. 
WORKSHOP J. 1 (1991).  On the impact of cultural history on American history, see Casey 
Nelson Blake, Culturalist Approaches to Intellectual History, in A COMPANION TO 
AMERICAN CULTURAL HISTORY 383 (Karen Halttunen ed., 2008). 
 31. See generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM (1993); 
JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:  THE NEW NATION IN 
CRISIS (1993). 
 32. See generally MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT:  ORIGINS 
OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003). 
 33. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY:  A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
1789–1815 141 (2009). 
 34. TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY:  “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND THE 
TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 221 (2007). 
 35. THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION:  FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 46–60 (1986). 
 36. See Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, A New Look at the Whiskey Rebellion, in THE 
WHISKEY REBELLION:  PAST AND PRESENT PERSPECTIVES 97, 110–11 (Steven R. Boyd ed., 
1985). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. at 110. 
 39. WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION:  GEORGE WASHINGTON, 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED AMERICA’S 
NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY (2006); SLAUGHTER, supra note 35. 
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rituals of protest and communal justice.40  Threatening pseudonymous notes 
appeared in the press and on public placards with the signature of “Tom the 
Tinker,” who threatened to “mend” the stills of whiskey producers with 
lead from his musket.41  Tax collectors were burned in effigy and in some 
instances subjected to the painful and humiliating process of being tarred 
and feathered.42  By 1794, anger and frustration over the excise reached a 
crisis point. 
No local figure was more despised in western Pennsylvania than excise 
officer John Neville.43  Born into an affluent planter family in Virginia, 
Neville was a Federalist in politics and an aristocrat by bearing.44  A rich 
land speculator, he had made huge profits in western Pennsylvania land 
transactions.45  Neville’s country estate, Bower Hill, was situated atop a hill 
with a commanding view of the countryside in what is now Allegheny 
County.46  While most western Pennsylvanians lived in simple cabins of 
rough-hewn logs, hovels by comparison with Bower Hill, Neville’s 
mansion was lavishly appointed with fine furniture and carpets in every 
room.47  The walls of his home were adorned with over two dozen 
paintings, and he boasted a fine gentleman’s library that contained richly 
bound leather volumes and finely illustrated maps.48  Bower Hill was 
among the grandest structures in all of western Pennsylvania.49  In short, in 
an area in which most families lived close to subsistence, Neville lived in 
high aristocratic style.50 
On July 17, 1794, a crowd of over five hundred armed tax protestors 
marched on Bower Hill.51  Aware of the rising levels of violence in the 
region and fearing the wrath of the mob, Neville requested a detachment of 
federal soldiers to guard his house, and he even took the unusual precaution 
of arming his slaves.52  When the protestors arrived, shots were exchanged, 
and in the resulting melee, two protestors, including a popular 
 
 40. See generally HUGH H. BRACKENRIDGE, INCIDENTS OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE 
WESTERN PARTS OF PENNSYLVANIA (1795); WILLIAM FINDLEY, HISTORY OF THE 
INSURRECTION IN THE FOUR WESTERN COUNTIES OF PENNSYLVANIA (1796).  On plebeian 
traditions of protest, see generally SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS:  ANTI-
FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA 1788–1828 (1999); RIOT AND 
REVELRY IN EARLY AMERICA (William Pencak et al. eds., 2002); Alfred F. Young, English 
Plebeian Culture and Eighteenth-Century American Radicalism, in THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN RADICALISM 185 (Margaret Jacob & James Jacob eds., 1984); Peter Linebaugh, 
All the Atlantic Mountains Shook, 10 LABOR/LE TRAVAILLEUR 87 (1982). 
 41. HOGELAND, supra note 39, at 130. 
 42. BOUTON, supra note 34, at 224. 
 43. SLAUGHTER, supra note 35, at 115, 179. 
 44. Id. at 152. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id.  On the material culture of Neville’s estate, see RONALD C. CARLISLE, THE 
STORY OF “WOODVILLE”:  THE HISTORY, ARCHITECTURE, AND ARCHAEOLOGY OF A WESTERN 
PENNSYLVANIA FARM 70–77 (1998). 
 47. SLAUGHTER, supra note 35, at 152. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 179. 
 52. Id. at 180. 
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Revolutionary War veteran and a federal soldier, were slain.53  The 
incensed crowd set Bower Hill ablaze, and by the following morning 
Neville’s grand estate was reduced to ashes.54  House attacks were also part 
of plebeian culture and generally did not result in the kind of violence and 
devastation visited on Bower Hill.  Typically, angry crowds targeted luxury 
goods; such actions were a direct assault on some of the most ostentatious 
symbols of status and wealth.55  In the cases of more serious attacks, a 
home might literally be disassembled and torn down.56  Such actions served 
as a powerful reminder to elites that homes erected with the labor of 
ordinary folk could literally be brought low by the awesome power of the 
people.  The exchange of gunfire at Neville’s home changed the nature of 
this traditional script.  Rather than follow the customary pattern of ritual 
house assault, events at Bower Hill spun out of control.  Instead of 
“deconstructing” Neville’s home, the incensed mob utterly destroyed it, 
leaving little to salvage. 
Although the state of Pennsylvania initially rejected offers of federal 
assistance to deal with western unrest, the intensification of violence, 
including the events at Bower Hill, impelled the Washington 
Administration to take decisive action to end the protests—by force if 
necessary.57  After consulting with his Cabinet, which was divided over the 
appropriate course of action, Washington adopted a two-prong strategy to 
end the insurrection.58  A group of federal commissioners was appointed to 
meet with rebels and protesters.59  The commission would offer amnesty for 
an immediate cessation of hostilities and all acts of lawlessness, but it 
would not assent to any political concessions.60  In the likely event that 
protestors refused to stand down, Washington also prepared to mobilize 
over 12,000 militia members from the neighboring states of Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, New Jersey, and Virginia.61  The Pennsylvania liberty pole cases 
emerged in the midst of this tumult. 
II.  LIBERTY POLES:  NATIONALIST ICON OR PLEBEIAN STANDARD? 
Few political symbols were as powerful and as malleable as the liberty 
pole.  In the iconography of early American political culture, the image of 
the classical Goddess of Liberty nestling under her arm a pole topped by a 
cap drew on a symbolic tradition stretching back to ancient Rome.62  In the 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., PETER SHAW, AMERICAN PATRIOTS AND THE RITUALS OF REVOLUTION 197–
200 (1981); ROBERT BLAIR ST. GEORGE, CONVERSING BY SIGNS:  POETICS OF IMPLICATION IN 
COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND CULTURE 205–97 (1998). 
 56. ST. GEORGE, supra note 55, at 205–97. 
 57. See generally Richard H. Kohn, The Washington Administration’s Decision to Crush 
the Whiskey Rebellion, 59 J. AM. HIST. 567 (1972). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 575. 
 60. Id. at 575–76. 
 61. Id. at 578–79. 
 62. See generally E. McClung Fleming, From Indian Princess to Greek Goddess:  The 
American Image, 1783–1815, 3 WINTERTHUR PORTFOLIO 37 (1967). 
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Roman Republic, the ritual of freeing a slave included placing a cap on the 
emancipated slave’s head.63  The revival and rediscovery of the liberty pole 
and cap in the modern era occurred in the seventeenth-century Dutch 
struggle for independence from Spain.64  To appeal to their countrymen, 
Dutch artists modernized the ancient cap, replacing it with the broad-
brimmed hat more typical of contemporary Dutch fashion.65  During the 
English Glorious Revolution of the seventeenth century, the supporters of 
the Dutch prince William of Orange brought over this symbol of the liberty 
pole and cap.66  Eventually, artists dropped the Dutch-style hat in favor of a 
more traditional Roman-style cap.67  During the eighteenth century, the 
Whig supporters of parliamentary power adopted this image as their own.68 
The American Revolution popularized the image of the liberty pole, 
which was widely used as a symbol in political cartoons and was reborn and 
brought to life as a popular political symbol in the maritime community of 
New York.69  After the repeal of the Stamp Act, New Yorkers, led by 
workers from the maritime trades, known as the “Jack Tars,” set up a mast 
or flagpole near the British army barracks in the city.70  The location of the 
pole, in the backyard of British troops, only underscored the  provocative 
nature of raising the pole.71  The pole flew flags with a variety of messages, 
including the word “LIBERTY” for all to see.72  British troops viewed the 
pole as an insult and attacked it on multiple occasions.73  In this escalating 
conflict between New Yorkers and British forces, multiple efforts were 
made to buttress the pole, which became known as “the Liberty Pole.”74  As 
violence between the opposing sides escalated, the pole came to resemble 
an armed ship’s mast, encased in metal plates and studded with nails to 
impede efforts to chop it down.75  New Yorkers also posted a guard around 
their new standard to prevent future attacks.76 
In the period after the Revolution, the icon of the liberty pole proliferated 
along with images of the Goddess of Liberty, a fitting symbol for the new 
American Republic.77  The classical image of the Goddess of Liberty had 
been domesticated and Americanized.  In some cases, Columbia, an 
Americanized version of Britannia, stood in for the Goddess of Liberty.78  
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Columbia typically sported some element of stylized “native” clothing to 
signal America’s hybrid nature as a product of both the old world and the 
new.79  Columbia also was often portrayed with a liberty pole and cap.80  
Images of Columbia and Liberty could be found emblazoned on pottery, 
adorning the covers of magazines, and even used as a model for women’s 
samplers and other forms of needlework.81 
The intensity of ideological conflict and rising partisanship in the 1790s 
tested the limits of America’s commitment to the ideals of liberty.  It is easy 
to forget how fraught American politics was in the years immediately 
following the adoption of the Constitution.82  Not only did the ratification 
of the Constitution not alleviate the profound divisions in American 
politics, if anything, the outbreak of the French Revolution exacerbated 
these tensions.83  There was a brief period when Federalists and 
Republicans each rallied around the cause of the French Revolution, but 
this harmony collapsed as events in France moved in an increasingly radical 
direction.84  By the middle of the 1790s, loyalty to France or her opponent, 
Great Britain, was a defining feature of American politics.85  For 
Federalists, the Jacobin ideas of the French Revolution were a cautionary 
reminder that radical ideas, including homegrown ones spouted by 
Jefferson and other Republicans, threatened the core values of the American 
Revolution and the future of America’s constitutional experiment.86  
Republicans were no less ardently convinced that Federalists sought to 
refashion America in the image of Great Britain and destroy the democratic 
and egalitarian achievements of the American Revolution.87  By the end of 
the decade, political animosities had reached such a level of partisan fervor 
that President John Adams requested that his home residence be fortified 
with weaponry borrowed from the Department of War to prevent mob 
actions against him for being pro-British.88 
Given the increasingly tense atmosphere of the 1790s, it is remarkable 
that America could find any common political images or icons to rally 
around.  One of the images that was sorely tested during this period was the 
liberty pole.  Although the feminized Goddess of Liberty holding a pole 
continued to adorn a range of objects and figures in paintings and popular 
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prints, the physical act of raising a liberty pole became more vexed.89  
There was a brief period in the early 1790s when liberty poles did play a 
role in public culture that transcended the growing partisan divisions 
agitating the nation, but this period did not last long.90  From the outset, 
there were always some important differences between the way liberty 
poles were deployed in Federalist events and the way they were used in 
more spontaneous protests by plebeian crowds.91  Federalist liberty pole 
raisings were generally staged in a way that underscored the value of 
hierarchy and a vision of well-regulated or ordered liberty.92  Events such 
as Washington’s birthday were perfect occasions to make use of the 
powerful symbolism of the liberty pole because the ceremonies of the day 
effectively contained its potentially radical message.93  These occasions 
were designed to promote consensus and evoke themes of nationalism and 
unity.  Militia units often participated in these events, but they acted in an 
official capacity and adhered to the hierarchies of rank.94  The signs, 
banners, placards, and toasts offered up on these occasions also served the 
ideological goal of promoting deference to a virtuous elite, with 
Washington himself serving as the best expression of this idea.95  Specific 
toasts lauded the actions of other leading Federalists such as Adams, Jay, 
and Hamilton.96  By the time of the Whiskey Rebellion, the use of liberty 
poles as a prop in public rituals by Federalists was waning.97  Indeed, the 
emergence of a radical plebeian street culture, in which liberty poles played 
a vital role during the Whiskey Rebellion, led many Republicans to distance 
themselves from this potent symbol.98 
Although one must approach accounts of liberty pole raisings in the 
Federalist press with some caution, these descriptions characterize such 
events as “disorderly” and “riotous.”99  Additionally, the composition of the 
crowds associated with them was often disparaged.  One writer described 
them as composed of men of “low birth” who were “without property.”100  
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Nor is it surprising that Federalists would denounce the liberty poles as 
“false” standards of liberty and deride them as “anarchy poles.”101 
The slogans favored by the plebeian crowds associated with the use of 
liberty poles were more aggressive and egalitarian than those that had been 
deployed in the nationalist rituals of unity staged by Federalists.102  Signs 
on plebeian poles proclaimed, “Liberty or Death,”103 or voiced the ideal of 
“Equal Taxation.”104  Instead of honoring the hierarchies of rank, plebeian 
rituals such as these were infused with a more egalitarian spirit and boasted 
a more carnival-like atmosphere.105 
III.  REPUBLICAN LIBERTY AND 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE STREETS 
It was in the midst of this tense, politically volatile setting that Justice of 
the Peace Daniel Montgomery found himself having to make a difficult 
choice about the raising of a liberty pole in the public streets of 
Northumberland, Pennsylvania.106  The basic facts in Respublica v. 
Montgomery were not disputed by either side.  Judge William Wilson and 
Magistrate William Cooke sought Montgomery’s assistance to disperse a 
crowd of pro-Whiskey Rebellion protestors and tear down their “liberty 
pole (falsely so called).”107  Rather than assist them, Montgomery 
expressed his sympathy with the protestors, declaring that the assembled 
crowd “were determined to have their grievances redressed,” and they 
“would erect the pole.”108  Not only were the actions of the protestors 
legitimate, Montgomery confessed that “for his part he would put to his 
shoulder to lift or pull at the rope, if required by the ‘people.’”109 
Wilson subsequently charged him with failing to uphold his office as a 
conservator of the peace.110  The only legal justification and plausible 
defense Montgomery might have mounted was that his actions had been 
motivated by simple prudence and a desire to avoid further violence, which 
is precisely what he ended up arguing in his defense.111  The court rejected 
his defense and concluded that his actions were not simply expedient, not a 
calculated attempt to avoid possible death or injury at the hands of the 
angry crowd and avoid a bad situation becoming worse: 
If his conduct arose from weak nerves, or an imperious necessity, he 
would fairly have declared so upon oath; but his expressions shew that his 
errors were not confined to his head; they reached his heart; and, at the 
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time of the riot, he could not have been considered as even a neutral 
character.112 
The court determined that he had not acted out of prudence, but out of 
political sympathy with the protest.113  The facts of the case do seem to 
warrant this conclusion about Montgomery’s state of mind and intentions.  
Montgomery’s own statements and the affidavits produced certainly 
support such a conclusion.114  Montgomery had not simply refused to 
disperse the crowd; he had admitted that he gladly would have assisted 
them in raising the pole.  Montgomery’s subsequent actions also confirm 
that he supported the crowd’s actions.  Following the first confrontation, 
Wilson returned armed to the scene to break up the illegal assembly.  As the 
court record makes clear: 
An affray took place between one of the rioters and a friend to good order, 
and some blows passed.  Mr. Wilson read what he called the riot act, to 
induce the multitude to disperse, but they refused.  One of them presented 
a musket at him, and he presented his pistol also.115 
In response to this turn of events, Montgomery proceeded against Wilson 
for drawing his weapon, not against the members of the crowd and its 
leaders.116  Thus, Montgomery viewed Wilson, not the rioters, as the 
aggressor in this situation and the one responsible for committing the 
affray.117 
If the assembly were a riot, or even a tumultuous assembly, the 
obligations of a peace officer were clear.  Montgomery would have been 
duty bound to assist Wilson in putting down the riot and would have been 
justified in using force, including armed force, if necessary.118  Indeed, 
under such circumstances it would have been the legal obligation of every 
citizen to assist the justice of the peace and restore order.119  If the protest 
was a riot, then Wilson was legally justified in brandishing his weapon.  
The fact that Montgomery charged Wilson, not the protestors, with an 
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affray further underscores the fact that Montgomery believed the protestors’ 
actions were legal and constitutionally protected.120 
IV.  FEDERALISTS, REPUBLICANS, AND PLEBEIANS:  
THE CONTESTED MEANING OF RIGHTS IN THE WHISKEY REBELLION 
The legal issues raised by Montgomery demonstrate a deep divide over 
the meaning and scope of the rights of assembly and speech.121  The 
Federalist view was captured by Judge Alexander Addison in a case 
originating in Pittsburgh, closer to the center of the protest.  Addison 
explained that the raising of a liberty pole was, at a very minimum, a public 
nuisance if it were done on public property without legal sanction.122  
Raising a pole might also, depending on the circumstances and the intent of 
the parties, be riotous or seditious even if it were done on private land.123  
In short, for Addison and most Federalists, the only time in which the 
raising of a liberty pole was legal was when the action was undertaken as 
part of a public celebration, sanctioned by law. 
Addison’s legal position was clearly spelled out in his decision in 
Pennsylvania v. Morrison.124  In that case, Addison averred that “the act of 
raising a pole in the street is itself unlawful, independent of any other ill 
intention.”125  In the case of the pole at issue in Morrison, and similar acts 
across western Pennsylvania during the Whiskey Rebellion, it was beyond 
dispute “that the intention was unlawful opposition to the government.”126  
In short, Addison did not believe that individuals or groups of individuals 
had a constitutionally protected right of assembly or speech that included 
such actions.127  The notion that groups of individuals might set themselves 
up as intermediaries between the people and their government was, in 
Addison’s view, the very worst form of factionalism.128  Addison and other 
Federalists had used the same logic to denounce the Democratic-Republican 
societies that had emerged across the United States in the previous year.  
Although not officially linked to the Republican movement in any formal or 
systematic fashion, most of the societies had close ties to local Republicans. 
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Their goal was to influence public opinion.  In addition to publishing their 
sentiments about political issues, the societies staged celebrations, gave 
festive dinners, and sponsored public orations.  Republicans viewed the 
societies as a way to improve understanding of political issues and refine 
public opinion.  Federalists, including Addison, denounced them for 
encouraging disharmony and suspicion.  For Federalists, such “self-created 
societies” were little more than factions whose activities sowed discord and 
corrupted politics.129  Given this view, it made perfect sense that Federalists 
denounced them and blamed the Democratic-Republican societies for 
paving the way for the Whiskey Rebellion.130 
Republican attitudes toward the Democratic-Republican societies and 
their views of liberty poles were a mirror image of their Federalist 
opponents’ views.  Republicans believed that the societies served a vital 
role by diffusing information and providing an institutional site for public 
debate and reasoned discussions.131  The logic of this argument also applied 
to the use of liberty poles.  If groups of citizens were legally entitled to 
gather together on matters of public concern, the use of a liberty pole as a 
rallying point could hardly be illegal.132  Instead of viewing them as 
“anarchy poles,” as Federalists did, Republicans embraced them as part of 
America’s revolutionary heritage and a potent reminder of the hard-won 
liberties gained by independence.133  William Findley, one of the most 
prominent Republican politicians in western Pennsylvania, defended both 
of these positions at the outset, but as violence spread and Federalists 
intensified their attacks on pole raisings, he was forced to concede that the 
use of them in the current context of the western Pennsylvania insurrection 
had become so closely identified with armed resistance as to be 
indisputably seditious.134  Still, Findley refused to accept that the liberty 
pole could not again serve as a symbol of freedom or tool of legitimate 
protest.  The legality of raising a pole, he argued, depended entirely on the 
intent of those raising the pole and the circumstances in which they 
acted.135  Despite his best efforts to assert a more expansive vision of 
freedom of assembly and the right of symbolic speech (one far closer in 
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spirit to modern First Amendment doctrine), Findley’s views remained a 
minority point of view, and he was forced to accept defeat in 1794.136 
The views of Montgomery and the plebeian protestors in 
Northumberland were also decisively defeated for the moment.  Federalists 
employed the well-regulated militia protected by the Second Amendment as 
an agent of repression, not a final check on federal tyranny as some Anti-
Federalists had hoped.137  The Whiskey Rebellion quickly collapsed in the 
face of federal power. 
To understand what freedom of assembly and speech meant to the parties 
in Montgomery, one must connect them to the wider web of beliefs shaping 
the way Federalists and plebeians approached law and politics.  Neither side 
supported the type of modern, liberal rights-based vision of assembly or 
speech that is central to First Amendment doctrine.138 
The plebeian conception of the rights of assembly and speech was closely 
connected to a communitarian understanding of liberty.  It was not a 
progenitor for a modern-style theory of expressive rights or associational 
rights.  The language used by Montgomery to defend his actions 
underscores this point:  he defended the raising of a liberty pole because it 
expressed the will of the local community, not because there was a broad 
individual right to express one’s views, even when those views were 
unpopular.139  It is doubtful that Montgomery or any members of the liberty 
pole crowds in western Pennsylvania would have defended the rights of 
unpopular minority voices to speak.  In Carlisle, Pennsylvania, a scene of 
vibrant protests during the insurrection, pro-Whiskey Rebellion protestors 
shouted down their opponents, hardly the type of actions one would expect 
from protestors driven by a libertarian ideal.140  A close look at the actions 
of the Whiskey Rebellion rebels themselves dispels any lingering doubts 
about the collective nature of their protests, which shared little with 
libertarian theories of rights.  The rebels drew on a variety of plebeian 
practices and rituals designed to intimidate and silence those who opposed 
their cause.141  Harassment sometimes took the form of burning individuals 
in effigy, a symbolic humiliation, but there were also cases of brutal 
physical harassment, including the use of tar and feathers.142  Thus, the 
plebeian conception of freedom of assembly and speech evidenced in 
Montgomery showed little, if any, tolerance for views at odds with those of 
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the local community.  The goal of the protest was to promote and affirm 
community solidarity, not to encourage a robust marketplace of ideas.143 
Modern “rights talk” generally is cast in liberal individualistic terms.144  
By contrast, the text of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 makes it 
exceedingly clear that the right to assemble and speak was still framed in a 
republican idiom.145  Both the language and substance of “rights talk” in 
post-Revolutionary America was steeped in ideas and beliefs quite alien to 
modern legal discourse.146  Rights in the Founding era were generally 
derived from an eclectic set of sources, including Enlightenment thought, 
common law, civic humanism, republicanism, and American experience 
both during the Revolution and the Confederation Period.147  Indeed, the 
text of the Pennsylvania Constitution expressly framed both assembly and 
speech in terms of the common good, not in terms of a right of individual 
expression or the right of individuals to associate: 
That the citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together 
for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of 
government for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by 
petition, address, or remonstrance.148 
The language of Pennsylvania’s 1790 provision asserted that the exercise of 
this right was shaped by the purpose of furthering the “common good.”149  
It is hard to think of any modern rights provision that qualifies its purpose 
in such terms.  Yet, such language was common in many of the first state 
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constitutions.150  Pennsylvania’s provision further specified the manner in 
which these lawful goals might be legitimately pursued:  “by petition, 
address, or remonstrance.”151  Although individuals were the holders of 
these rights, their exercise was framed as a civic enterprise.152 
It is easy to see why Judge Addison and other Federalists might conclude 
that assembling to raise a liberty pole was neither a protected form of 
assembly nor speech.  Rather than serve the common good, Federalists such 
as Addison were likely to see such actions as divisive and the very 
antithesis of the goal of promoting the common good.153  In contrast to 
legitimate forms of political expression, such as petition, addresses, or 
remonstrance, the use of a liberty pole was calculated to inflame passions, 
not promote reasoned discourse.  The type of street theater associated with 
plebeian political culture was simply outside the scope of constitutional 
protection for Addison.154 
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understood to be shaped by the purpose of promoting the common good.  Indeed, Volokh 
makes no effort to try to understand how Founding-era readers, including judges, would 
have construed such language.  Moreover, Volokh shows no awareness at all that reading 
texts historically requires abandoning the very modern models of legal reasoning he employs 
to make sense of Founding-era texts.  In short, Volokh’s entire approach rests on an 
anachronistic model of textual exegesis.  Compare Volokh’s approach with the holistic 
model discussed supra notes 22–30 and accompanying text, as well as the model elaborated 
in Gienapp, supra note 10. 
 154. The original draft of the Assembly Clause of the First Amendment also contained 
similar language about the common good, but this clause was deleted. See COGAN, supra 
note 144.  The omission of references to the common good in the final version of the First 
Amendment does not, however, mean that this conception vanished from American 
constitutionalism.  During the contentious debate over the meaning of the First Amendment 
during the Alien and Sedition Crisis, many Federalists, including Addison, continued to 
think about rights in a similar fashion. See NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST 
MAN:  AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 56–99 (1990). See generally 
LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND 
PRESS FREEDOM:  THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1988).  For an 
interesting critique of Levy’s historical scholarship on this topic, see David M. Rabban, The 
Ahistorical Historian:  Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985).  On the incompatibility of most modern First Amendment 
doctrine and the original meanings and practices of the Founding generation, see Lawrence 
Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common 
Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1 (2011). 
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V.  HISTORICISM, ETHNOGRAPHY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANINGS 
The analysis of Montgomery sketched in this Essay illustrates how a new 
constitutional historicism, one influenced by a historically informed 
constitutional ethnography, can help scholars make sense of the complexity 
of constitutional ideas from the Founding without resorting to the 
reductionist and anachronistic methods typical of most forms of 
constitutional originalism.155  There was a range of different understandings 
of the meaning of the rights to speak and assemble at play in Pennsylvania 
during the Whiskey Rebellion.  Two of those visions of law, a Federalist 
ideology and a plebeian one, came directly into conflict in Montgomery.  
Neither of these approaches to law resembles the modern rights-based 
theories that define First Amendment theory in contemporary law.156  
Federalists and plebeians each saw these rights as tied to an underlying 
obligation to participate in public life and rally the public and its political 
representatives when the common good required such interventions.  
Federalists and plebeians parted ways when it came to interpreting and 
applying this constitutional ideal.  Making sense of the two opposing legal 
cultures that came into conflict in Montgomery requires the type of holistic, 
anthropological model of analysis elaborated in this Essay.  The past really 
is “a foreign country,” and many familiar legal concepts were understood in 
radically different terms by members of the Founding generation.157  
Recognizing this fact does not mean that judges, lawyers, and scholars 
should abandon their interest in Founding-era constitutionalism.158  Given 
the traditions of American constitutional law, particularly its favored 
modalities of interpretation, some attention to history is almost 
 
 155. For an elaboration of the methodological flaws in contemporary originalist theory, 
see Cornell, supra note 11. 
 156. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 157. DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY 105–24 (1985).  The 
application of originalist insights to contemporary law, if done in an historically rigorous 
fashion (assuming such a practice is even possible), would also undermine many other well-
established features of modern constitutional law. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and 
Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 392–93 
(2007).  The claim of John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport that originalism produces 
desirable outcomes is therefore hard to credit. See generally JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL 
B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013) (assuming that the 
Constitution has a firm supermajoritarian foundation). See also id. at 11 (asserting “that good 
consequences are produced by a constitution that incorporates the core principles of the 
liberal tradition and has the support of the people”).  For a critique of the anachronistic and 
simplistic assumptions that mar their approach to originalism, see Cornell, supra note 23.  
For jurisprudential critiques, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of 
History in Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1771 (2015) and 
James E. Fleming, Fidelity, Change, and the Good Constitution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 515 
(2014). 
 158. In this regard, the notion of holism discussed above points in the direction of a 
translation model of constitutional interpretation. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and 
Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 
TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).  For an elaboration of this connection, see Gienapp, supra note 
10. 
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inevitable.159  Yet, it is important when reading texts from the Founding era 
to read them historically, not anachronistically.160  The goal of such 
inquiries ought to be to understand the richness of the American 
constitutional tradition and its evolving nature.  The methods discussed 
above provide one set of tools to help judges, lawyers, and scholars 
accomplish that goal.  Whatever role history comes to play in the future of 
constitutional adjudication, it is important to get that history right before 
engaging in the complex and separate task of judging how such insights 
might or might not be applied to contemporary legal problems. 
 
 159. Text and history are two of the basic modalities of American constitutional 
interpretation identified by Philip Bobbitt. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (1991); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:  THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1982).  For a thoughtful gloss on these, see Ian C. Bartrum, Metaphors and 
Modalities:  Meditations on Bobbit’s Theory of the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 157 (2008).  For another useful typology of constitutional interpretation, see Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1189 (1987).  Although textual arguments are not always dispositive, it is hard to 
think of a mainstream constitutional theory that does not deal with text in some manner. See, 
e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 47 (2001).  Similarly, even 
scholars opposed to originalism generally accord some role to history in interpreting the 
Constitution. See Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword to IT IS A CONSTITUTION WE ARE 
EXPOUNDING:  COLLECTED WRITINGS ON INTERPRETING OUR FOUNDING DOCUMENT 8 (2009), 
https://www.acslaw.org/pdf/ACS_Expounding_FNL.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y757-HBGE]; 
Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641 
(2013). 
 160. For two different views of how judges ought to deal with history, see Martin S. 
Flaherty, Foreword:  Historians and the New Originalism:  Contextualism, Historicism, and 
Constitutional Meaning, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 905 (2015) and Helen Irving, Outsourcing the 
Law:  History and the Disciplinary Limits of Constitutional Reasoning, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 
957 (2015). 
